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Abstract:  
This paper relates unique data on criminal records of local politicians in India to 
corruption, crime and poverty. Using a regression discontinuity design, whereby 
individuals living in districts where a criminal politician barely won are compared to 
individuals living in districts where a criminal politician barely lost, this paper shows that 
criminal politicians reduce bribe-taking behavior of law and order officials by 34 percent. 
One possible explanation for this result is that when interests of politicians and those of 
interest groups converge, criminal politicians’ control over bureaucrats acts as a 
substitute for bribes from these interest groups. This is not to say that criminal politicians 
should be elected to eradicate corruption, but rather that corruption is underestimated if 
only measured by bribe-taking without taking into account political control: as less bribes 
need to be paid, criminal offences, similar to those mostly committed by criminal 
politicians, increase by 25 percent. Moreover, the urban headcount radio, the welfare of 
those not connected with politicians, increases by 22 percent. 
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I Introduction
Corruption is detrimental to investment and growth1. Understanding what drives
corruption is thus a topic of rst-order importance2. Criminal politicians have often
been cited as primary contributors to corruption in the popular press3, yet there is lit-
tle evidence on their e¤ects. Theoretically, it is not clear whether criminal politicians
increase or reduce bureaucratic corruption, measured as bribes following the previous
literature. On the one hand, they might encourage bribe-taking by lowering the per-
ceived probability of bureaucrats being prosecuted for corruption. On the other hand,
if politicians control law and order o¢ cials, then criminal politicians could misuse this
power to prevent the prosecution of crimes committed by people like themselves, thus
lowering the need for bribes. Empirically, evaluating the e¤ects of criminal politicians
is plagued with problems of identication. For example, corruption, crime and poverty
might breed the emergence of criminal politicians4. Conversely, criminal politicians may
be the consequence of a highly e¢ cient judiciary, which can simultaneously reduce cor-
ruption and crime5. In addition, while traditional denitions of bureaucratic corruption
pertain primarily to bribery, this paper indicates that other types of corruption should be
considered (e.g. political control) as the single-construct denition may be insu¢ cient.
This paper explores, both theoretically and empirically, the e¤ect of criminal politi-
cians on bribery, criminal activity and poverty. India provides an ideal testing ground:
23 percent of the members of the lower house of parliament have a criminal background,
including charges such as murder, rape, kidnapping and extortion6. A surprise Supreme
Court decision in 2003 mandated all political candidates to reveal their criminal records
1See Mauro (1995) for the seminal empirical cross-country paper on the e¤ects of corruption and
Lambsdor¤ (2005) for a review of the literature.
2In his literature review, Lambsdor¤ (2005) cites empirical cross country studies on government size
and decentralization, institutional quality, competition, recruitement and salaries, press freedom and
the judiciary, democracy and the political system, cultural determinants as determinants of corruption.
Fisman et al (2008) and Olken (2008) are notable exceptions in this mainly cross-country literature.
3As G. P. Joshi relates in Police Accountability in India: Policing Contaminated by Politics, many
politicians have a criminal background. Surely their presence in positions of power can only encourage
criminals. [...] When the assurance of impunity comes from the highest quarters in the government,
police o¢ cers become emboldened to misuse their powers [...].
4which would lead to a spurious positive correlation between criminal politicians and corruption by
a standard reverse causality argument.
5This would lead to a spurious negative correlation between criminal politicians and corruption,
caused by the underlying factor of an e¢ cient judiciary.
6http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070815/independence/main6.htm
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(including not only past convictions, but also acquittals, discharges, and cases pending
against them7), assets, liabilities and educational qualications for state (Assembly) and
federal (Lok Sabha) elections. For all of the 2004 elections, 178 districts were identied
in which a criminal candidate faced a non-criminal candidate. This paper aims to relate
the criminal records of politicians to microeconomic measures of bribery of law and order
o¢ cials living in their districts8, reported criminal activity9 and poverty levels10 within
each district.
A key question in this analysis is causation, as criminal politicians (and people
electing criminal politicians) may di¤er in observable and unobservable ways from non-
criminal politicians (and the people not electing them). To address this concern, I
use a regression discontinuity design that compares districts where a criminal politician
barely won an election to a non-criminal candidate, and hence barely became elected, to
districts where the criminal politician barely lost the election to a non-criminal politi-
cian. The crucial assumption here is that, even if agents can inuence the vote, there
is nonetheless a non-trivial random chance component to the ultimate score di¤erence
between the two candidates (Lee, 2008). A strong empirical test of the internal va-
lidity of the regression discontinuity design (that will be performed in this paper) is
that, in a neighborhood of the discontinuity (score di¤erence between the criminal and
non-criminal candidate equal to 0), treated and control groups should possess the same
distribution of baseline characteristics, as in a randomized controlled trial. Intuitively, if
there exists a random chance element (that has a continuous density) to the nal score
di¤erence, then whether the criminal candidate wins in a closely contested election with
a non-criminal candidate, is determined as if by a ip of a coin.
Contrary to popular perception, this paper shows that criminal politicians reduce
bribe-taking of law and order o¢ cials, measured as value of gifts receivedand gap
7This distinction is important as one may wonder why there would be any convicted politicians in a
corrupt system. However, in a completely corrupt system, it is still possible for a judge to investigate
thoroughly, accuse, and acquit in exchange for a higher bribe. Thus, all politicians subject to this
procedure are dened as criminal politicians in this analysis.
8Microeconomic data from the 1999-2000 (55th round) and 2004-2005 (61st round) of the consump-
tion datasets of the National Sample Survey of India
9District-level data from Crime In India 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, the annual reports from the
National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home A¤airs, Government of India
10District-level data from the 1999-2000 (55th round) and 2004-2005 (61st round) of the consumption
datasets of the National Sample Survey of India
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between reported expenditures and earnings (as in Gorodnichenko et al, 2007). For
example, law and order (as well as administrative) o¢ cials living in districts where a
criminal politician barely won have an income-consumption gap 34 percent lower than
similar o¢ cials living in districts where a criminal politician barely lost. This may be
due to the signicant inuence local politicians can have on law and order (and admin-
istrative) o¢ cials, through such actions as punitive transfers. While this inuence was
originally designed as a check of the executive on law, order, and administrative o¢ cials,
criminal politicians may employ this inuence to control these o¢ cials for the benet of
the interest groups they protect. This theory is conrmed by the fact that no such e¤ect
is found when criminal politicians have less political control over bureaucrats (such as
when criminal politicians are from the Bharatiya Janata Party, a party committed to the
independence of the judiciary, thus ideologically less able to misuse punitive transfers;
or when other occupations less inuenced by politicians by nature are considered).
This is not to say that criminal politicians should be elected to reduce corruption.
As less bribes to law and order o¢ cials need to be paid, criminal activity increases for
the categories of crime committed by the criminal politicians in o¢ ce and in districts
where a criminal politician barely won. For example, crime categories such as o¤ences
against human body and public order, o¤ences similar to those primarily committed
by criminal politicians, experience an approximate 25 percent increase after a criminal
politician is elected. Moreover, criminal politicians have adverse consequences on the
welfare of those not connected to them, such as the poorer individuals in their districts.
It is found in this paper that the urban headcount ratio increases by 22 percent because
of criminal politicians.
This paper relates to the vast literature on corruption, and more precisely on its
causes by suggesting a rigorous methodology to evaluate the impact of criminal politi-
cians on corruption. It contributes to the literature on measurement of corruption by
using microeconomic measures such as the value of gifts received and the consumption-
income gap of law, order, and administrative o¢ cials, rather than subjective perception-
based indices that do not provide quantitative estimates of bribery. However, this paper
also shows that measures of corruption which focus only on bribes and exclude capture
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by special interests (such as in this case the threat of punitive transfers exercised by
politicians over law, order, and administrative o¢ cials) provide a misleading impression
of the true welfare e¤ects of criminal politicians. In this case, one cannot interpret the
reduction in bribe-taking as a desirable outcome, since a side consequence is the en-
couragement of criminal activity and its adverse impact on the poor. Thus, research
using the traditional denition of corruption (i.e. bribes) may not be su¢ cient to fully
explicate the role of criminal politicians in bureaucratic corruption.
Section II will present the phenomenon of criminal politicians in India and the ex-
tensive powers politicians have over law, order, and administrative o¢ cials. Section III
will use the canonical principal-agent model of corruption (Mookherjee et al, 1995) to
show how criminal politicians may reduce bribe-taking by bureaucrats if the criminal
politician (principal) can punitively transfer a law and order o¢ cial (the agent) in order
to favor private individuals connected to the politician (the client). Section IV describes
the regression discontinuity design used to test the theoretical predictions, while section
V describes the results and section VI concludes.
II Background
This section will rst describe the phenomenon of criminal politicians in India. It
will then describe the powerful tool, in the hands of politicians, of transfer of judges,
policemen and administrative o¢ cials. While originally designed as a check of the exec-
utive on law and order, and administrative o¢ cials11, some politicians may employ this
inuence to achieve their political objectives.
II.1 Criminal politicians in India
As per Election Commission estimates, 1,500 candidates in the 1996 parliamentary elec-
tion had criminal records and 40 of them got elected to the 11th Lok Sabha. In the state
legislatures, out of the 4,072 sitting members of the legislative assembly in all the states,
more than 700 have criminal records12. The present (14th) Lok Sabha (the lower house
of the parliament of India) has 125 members (23 percent) with criminal background.
11One rationale for transferring o¢ cials is to prevent corruption, by breaking up networks of corrupt
individuals and creating social distancebetween o¢ cials and members of the public.
12http://www.indiaelectionwatch.net/whatisew.htm
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Serious charges of murder, rape, kidnapping, extortion and the like are pending against
many of them13.
Anecdotal evidence of the criminal-politician nexusabounds in India. For example,
Subhash C. Kashyap14 writes in Criminal-politician nexus getting stronger15:
The role of criminals in politics began in a big way with the criminals
needing the politiciansprotection against the processes of law and paying
them for it in advance by helping them in elections and otherwise. Politi-
cians needed huge sums of unaccounted money for political activities, their
parties, elections and for themselves. [...] Gradually, the politicians became
subservient to the dons of the crime world. The latter soon realised that the
elections were being won with their money and their muscle power. It was
not any surprise when they themselves decided to enter politics.
To counter this problem, one of the solutions envisaged by the Vohra Committee
report (1993)16 that studied the problem of the criminalisation of politics and of the
nexus among criminals, politicians and bureaucrats in India, was the publicization of
the criminal records of politicians. After much political opposition17, disclosure of crim-
inal antecedents and nancial records was made mandatory on March 13th 2003 by a
judgment of the Supreme Court18. Since then, the Election Commission of India re-
quires a candidate to le an a¢ davit disclosing criminal records (including not only past
convictions; but also acquittals, discharges, and cases pending 19), as well as information
on his or her assets, liabilities, and educational qualications. Scanned a¢ davits of all
candidates are publicly available on the India Election Commission website20. Severe
13http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070815/independence/main6.htm
14 former Secretary-General, Lok Sabha, and author of the six-volume History of Parliament of India
15The Tribune, India, 15 August 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070815/independence/main6.htm
16Report submitted by the former Indian Union Home Secretary, N.N. Vohra, in october 1993.
17For a fascinating account, see: http://www.adrindia.org/electionwatch/electionwatch.asp
18http://www.indiaelectionwatch.net/judgement.htm
19The exact text is: Whether the candidate is convicted, acquitted, discharged of any criminal o¤ence
in the past (if any, whether he is punished with imprisonment or ne). Prior to six months of ling
of nomination, whether the candidate is accused in any pending case, of any o¤ence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more, and in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the court
of law.
http://www.adrindia.org/electionwatch/electionwatch.asp
20For an example of a criminal politician, see:
http://archive.eci.gov.in/AE2004_A¢ davits/orissa/72/NNARAYANREDDY/NNARAYANREDDY.html
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penalties are imposed in case of false information21. Another concern with this measure
of criminal politicians is the possibility of wrongful accusations by rival candidates. Ac-
cording to this view, criminal politicians might have not committed any crimes. I will
address this concern in this paper by showing that there are no systematic di¤erences
between the accused and the convicted politicians.
We collected this data for all 2004 state (assembly) or federal (Lok Sabha) elections22.
We matched this data to the scores of politicians at these elections from the India
Election Commission website23. Out of 1071 elections contested in 2004, we found 286
candidates with a criminal records on their a¢ davits. For clarity, we restrict the sample
to the 178 districts where a criminal candidate faced a non-criminal candidate24. Table
1 shows descriptive statistics about these 178 criminal candidates. Table Appendix 1
compares these characteristics to the ones of non-criminal politicians in a regression
framework (the dependent variable is a variable taking the value 1 if the candidate
is criminal, 0 otherwise). Criminal politicians do not seem to be less educated or to
have more assets. However, they hold more liabilities and seem to be elected from
smaller districts. Pseudo R-squared are low, suggesting that criminal politicians di¤er
in other unobservable ways from non-criminal politicians. Addressing this concern is an
important contribution of this paper.
where the accusations are: Rioting, Rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly, Murder,
attempt to murder, Assault or use of criminal force to deter public servant from his duty, Hurting
for extortion, causing hurt by an act which endangers human life, mischief , wrongfully conning any
person ,causing grievous hurt , theft, Dacoity, criminal trespass, criminal intimidation.
facing the non-criminal politician:
http://archive.eci.gov.in/AE2004_A¢ davits/orissa/72/RAMACHANDRAPANDA/RAMACHANDRAPANDA.html
with the following results (p.86):
http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/SE_2004/StatisticalReports_OR_2004.pdf
21The facility of putting counter a¢ davit by a rival candidate on the notice board is a safeguard
against false information or suppression of information. Further, the Election Commission of India has
directed that if any complaint is made before Returning O¢ cer about false information or suppression of
information in the a¢ davit led by any candidate, supported by some documentary evidence, then the
Returning O¢ cer should le complaints before the competent authority for prosecution of the candidate
under Section 177 of Indian Penal Code read with Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Election
India, Vol. 1, No.3:
http://www.eci.gov.in/Library&Publications/ECI_NL_JULSEP_2004.pdf
22Directly from the a¢ davits available on the Election Commission of India website:
http://archive.eci.gov.in/A¢ davits/A¢ davits_fs.htm
or from the India election watch website:
http://indiaelectionwatch.net/disclosures.htm
23http://www.eci.gov.in/electionanalysis/election_analysis.asp
24In 18 cases, we decided to attribute the criminality status to the candidate that had more cases
pending against him, than his criminal opponent.
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This paper then attempts to relate the criminal status of politicians (now publicly
known) to the behavior of law and order, and administrative o¢ cials, criminal activity
and welfare. Indeed, as the Vohra Committee report states, criminal elements elected
to local bodies, State assemblies and national Parliament [...] have acquired considerable
political clout, seriously jeopardizing the smooth functioning of the administration and
the safety of the life and property of the common man causing a sense of despair and
alienation among people. In India, one powerful way for politicians to control law and
order, and administrative o¢ cials is the threat of transfer.
II.2 Transfer of judges
Dua (1983) relates well the history of independence of the judiciary and punitive transfers
in India. In 1975, Mrs. Gandhi declared a State of Emergency and launched a massive
crackdown on civil liberties and political opposition. Judges then began to interpret
the Constitution in light of the new political climate. The Janata Interregnum (1977-
79) attempted to restore to judges some degree of self-condence. The government
cancelled Mrs. Gandhis mass transfer of High Court judges in order to emphasize that
the Constitution was not in the business of punitive transfers (i.e. transfers without
consultation of Indias Chief Justice) of judges. However, the return to power of the
Congress (I) Party in 1980 saw Mrs. Gandhi bluntly call into question the judicial
integrity of the Janata-appointed judges25. Chief Justice Chandrachud complained that:
Since the Executive is controlled by political leaders...it may, it is feared,
transfer a judge to a far-o¤place like Sikkim, the Andaman Islands or Assam,
or refuse to grant him further extension if he does not toe the line26.
Due to internal dissension, the Supreme Court undermined in the same year its
independence in the JudgesTransfer Case, in which the majority of a seven-judge Con-
stitutional Bench o¤ered the government carte blanche to hire Supreme Court judges,
re temporary judges and transfer (except on a mass scale) High Court judges without
the consent of Indias Chief Justice. In other words, Mrs. Gandhi was given a free hand
25India Today, January 31, 1982, p.62
26Statesman weekly, May 2, 1981.
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to manage the judiciary as she liked. Despite the Second Judgescase in 1993 that slowed
down the rate of transfers27 and the rapid rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party,
a market-oriented centre-right party committed to the independence of the judiciary28,
Indian newspapers relate abundant anecdotal evidence of transfers of judges29.
II.3 Transfer of policemen
Under the Constitution of India, the police are the responsibility of state governments
with the organization and operations of police forces governed by rules and regulations
framed by state governments. As G. P. Joshi relates in Police Accountability in India:
Policing Contaminated by Politics30, the police, as an organized institution in the
country, came into existence with the Police Act of 1861. This legislation was passed in
the wake of the Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 when Indian soldiers in the colonial army
revolted against their British commanders. This prompted the British to set up a police
force that was totally subservient to the executive and not accountable to the community.
The Police Act of 1861 was kept in place after independence and the powers granted
to local politicians to exercise control and superintendence over the police remained the
same. As G. P. Joshi notes:
For several decades after independence, these deciencies did not matter
much as the standards of leadership, in both politics as well as the police, were
quite high. Gradually, however, the standards began declining with politics
becoming increasingly contentious and criminalised, leading to a perceptible
27Frontline, A awed mechanism, ZV.Venkatesan, 06/06/2003.
28Party Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party for the Elections to the 14th Lok Sabha (April-May
2004): The BJP is rmly committed to the independence of the judiciary.
http://www.indian-elections.com/partymanifestoes/bjp.html
29Transfer as a weapon, Kuldip Nayar, the Indian Express, April 14, 1998:
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980414/10450134.html
President refers judges appointment law to SC, the Indian Express, July 28, 1998:
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980728/20950754.html
The transfer of judges, Rajeev Dhavan, The Hindu, Friday, Oct 29, 2004:
http://www.hindu.com/2004/10/29/stories/2004102902351000.htm
Transfer of judges: Need for a transparent policy, Sudhanshu Ranjan, The Tribune, September 25,
2005:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050925/edit.htm#1
30Human Rights Solidarity, Vol. 15 No. 05 SEP 2005. G. P. Joshi is the programme coordinator of
the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative [CHRI] in New Delhi for issues relating to the police and
prisons.
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decline in the quality of control exercised over the police and increasing
misuse of the police by people in positions of power for partisan interests.
One of the powers of politicians is transfer. R. K. Raghavan (2003) notes that
unbending independent-minded o¢ cers can be harassed by frequent
transfers from one location to another, or between jobs. This device is em-
ployed to make o¢ cers submit themselves to orders of the executive that are
irregular. Such transfers can be devastating to o¢ cers with families, because
they mean the dislocation of domestic life. As a result, senior o¢ cers are
unlikely to displease the political masters when the latter ask for irregular
favors. Conformity rather than confrontation is therefore the order of the
day.31
II.4 Transfer of administrative o¢ cials
Transfers of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) o¢ cials, an elite group whose members
occupy most top posts in the civil service, are extremely rapid. Potter (1987) traced
movements of o¢ cials between 1976 and 1985, and found that under 50 percent of
o¢ cials lasted a year in their posts, well below the 3-year minimum incumbency rule
for IAS Collectors. When surveyed, IAS o¢ cers identied short tenure as the greatest
perceived problem they faced (Singh and Bhandarkar, 1994).
According to Kingston (2004), the cause of transfers most often identied in the
literature on Indian public administration is political interference. Kingston (2004)
describes the workings of the political interference:
Nominally, in India, transfers are decided by senior o¢ cials rather than
local politicians. However, in practice, Chief Ministers in the states, who
appoint the most senior o¢ cials, must retain the support of local politicians,
as their power is constantly under threat from defections to rival factions.
31Raghavan (2003) further notes that: For instance, when a subordinate o¢ cer seeks action for a
violation of the law, his supervisory o¢ cer may ght shy of acting because the individual concerned
belongs to the ruling party, which the supervisor is reluctant to displease. This sends the wrong signal
all the way down the line. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are very few instances of individuals
belonging to a party in government being arraigned before the courts for unlawful activities.
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They therefore routinely delegate inuence over transfers to local politicians
in exchange for their support. As a result, the transfer system in practice is
subject to political interference at all levels.
This section described the extent of the phenomenon of criminal politicians in India.
It also described how transfers may be construed, in the words of Wade (1982), as the
politicians basic weapon of control over the bureaucracy. The next section will describe
what may be the impact of transfers by criminal politicians on the behavior of law and
order, and administrative o¢ cials, as well as criminal activity.
III Theory
The traditional literature focuses on the principal-agent model of corruption (the
grabbing handmodel) to study the relationship between the principal, i.e. the top
level of government, and the agent, i.e. an o¢ cial who takes bribes from the private
individuals interested in some government-produced good (Banerjee, 1997; Mookherjee
et al, 1995; Shleifer et al, 1993). In these models, corruption typically arises whenever
there are informational asymmetries between the government and the public o¢ cial.
Implicit in these studies is the benevolence of the principal32, the objective being to nd
the states optimal choice of monitoring intensity, incentives and sanctions to constrain
o¢ cialsbehavior.
This assumption is not true in India. 125 members (23 percent) of the present (14th)
Lok Sabha (the lower house of the parliament of India) have a criminal background,
ranging from murder to rape, kidnapping and extortion33. Disconcerting is the fact that,
in India, local politicians exert signicant inuence on law and order, and administrative
o¢ cials, through, for example, punitive transfers34. Following closely Mookerjee et al
32In Banerjee (1997) on p.1289, we are looking for an explaination of government failures that makes
no reference to the rapacity of governments. In Shleifer et al (1993) on p.601, corruption with theft
implies that the o¢ cial does not turn over anyhting to the government at all, and simply hides the
sale(of a government good). In Mookherjee et al (1995), the social planner wishes to minimize external
harm of pollution to society.
33http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070815/independence/main6.htm
34While originally designed as a check of the executive on law and order, and administrative o¢ cials,
criminal politicians may employ this inuence to control law and order, and administrative o¢ cials for
the benet of the interest groups they protect (or, more directly, for their own benet in their criminal
activity).
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(1995), this paper explores the consequences of having criminal politicians in o¢ ce in a
principal-agent model where there might be a convergence of interests between top-level
of government and the private individuals interested in some government produced goods
(and in the extreme case that the top level government and these private individuals are
one and the same) and where the principal (criminal politicians) can punitively transfer
(or at least threaten to transfer) the agent (law and order, and administrative o¢ cials).
By committing an o¤ense, such as a murder, of gravitym, a criminal enjoys a private
benet g(m) strictly increasing, concave and di¤erentiable, but is also subject to a
ne f . The government employs a law and order o¢ cial, such as a judge, to enforce
this regulation. To investigate the criminal with intensity , the judge must incur
unobservable e¤ort e(), strictly increasing, convex and di¤erentiable. The intensity
 2 [0; 1] represents the probability that the judge will learn the criminals true crime
level, m, and secure evidence for successful prosecution. It is assumed that the criminal
knows the evidence that the judge nds. The judge has discretion over her choice of
e¤ort and the level of crime,
^
m, that she reports to the government. She is paid a xed
wage that will be omitted from the analysis for simplicity35. It is assumed that the
penalties on the judge for over-reporting are high enough such that
^
m  m.
The criminal may bribe the judge with an amount b to report a level of crime lower
than that for which she has evidence. By doing so, the criminal can reduce its ne from
fm to f
^
m. In such cases, the information about the bribe and the criminals true crime
level,m, leaks to the politician only if the criminal and the politician are well connected36.
This model thus concerns only the criminals well connected to politicians. A good
politician may then punish the judge with a transfer of xed cost T , but discounted by
the gravity of under-reporting m  ^m, with a certain exogenous probability  measuring
his ability to exercise a punishment. The judge will thus gain b  (m  ^m)T by taking
35A motivation payment proportional to the level of crime m could be introduced in this model. This
path is not followed for two reasons. First, the purpose of this paper is to focus on political control over
judges, not on the optimal compensation politicy to maximise a certain objective function. Second,
in India, salaries of judges as written in the constitution of India are xed and do not depend on the
amount of crimes successfully prosecuted.
36There is no informational symmetry in this paper between the criminal and the politician if they
are well connected. In the extreme case, this is equivalent to saying that the politician is the criminal
himself. On the other hand, there is perfect informational asymmetry between the criminal and the
politician if they are not connected, meaning that the mechanism does not work in this case.
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a bribe. There are no other penalties for giving or taking a bribe as these do not modify
the fundamental result of the model.
A bad (criminal) politician may use transfer in the opposite manner. If his interests
converge with the criminals (or if he is himself the criminal in question), he might
transfer the judge in case she reports the true level of crime, m, thus imposing a cost
mT to the judge. In such a case, the judge will gain b+ (m  ^m)T by taking a bribe.
These two situations (with a good or bad politician) are reconcilable in a single
expression: the judge gains b+(m  ^m)T by taking a bribe with  2 [ 1; 1] measuring
the criminality of politicians ( < 0 indicates a good politician, an increasing  indicates
an increasing criminal type of the politician). In other words, under the control of
a criminal politician, the judge gains from taking a bribe by obtaining a monetary
payment, but also by avoiding the cost of being transferred.
III.1 Bribery
Under this setting, it is possible to identify the conditions under which bribery emerges.
The expected gain of bribing for a criminal is thus f(m  ^m)  b as the criminal benets
from a lower ne but has to pay a bribe. As written above, the judge gains b+(m  ^m)T
by taking a bribe. A bribe will change hands if and only if both criminal and judge can
benet. Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for bribery is that:
f >  T (1)
Bribery may always occur with a criminal politician but whether bribery actually
occurs under a good politician depends endogenously on the governments policy. When
bribery is protable in the sense that the policy meets (1), and following Mookerjee et al
(1995), it is assumed that the criminal and the judge choose to report
^
m that maximizes
their joint prots f(m   ^m)   b + b + (m   ^m)T = (f + T )(m   ^m). By (1), joint
prots are decreasing in
^
m and so, will be maximized with
^
m = 0 (2)
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FollowingMookerjee et al (1995), it is further assumed that the criminal and the judge
agree upon a bribe that balances their net respective gains such that f(m   ^m)   b =
b+ (m  ^m)T . By (2), this implies that:
b =
1
2
(f   T )m (3)
A fundamental insight may be gained from this expression: the amount of bribe
depends negatively on the level of criminality, , of the politician. Criminal politicians
actually reduce the amount of bribe given37. This is because the threat of a transfer acts
as a substitute for monetary bribes. Similar to Mookherjee et al (1995), in the case of a
good politician ( < 0), an increasing transfer cost T raises the cost borne by the judge
for not reporting criminality, and thus merely raises the level of bribes paid. Only when
the transfer cost T is increased su¢ ciently to overturn (1) will corruption fall.
III.2 Criminal activity
We turn to the ex-ante incentives of the criminal (to commit an o¤ence), and the judge
(to investigate criminal activity) depending on the criminality of the politician. Consider
the case where bribery is protable in the sense that (1) is fullled. The judge investigates
at rate , and whenever she discovers evidence m, takes a bribe b and reports zero
crime38. The criminals expected prot is:
C(m;) = g(m)  1
2
(f   T )m (4)
Since this function is concave, the criminal will choose m such that:
g0(m) =
1
2
(f   T ) (5)
37The main result of Mookherjee et al (1995) may also be obtained from this model. To see this,
consider a good politican ( < 0) and an increasing transfer cost T . In this case, an increase in the
penalty against bribes raises the cost borne by the judge for not reporting pollution, and thus merely
raises the level of bribes paid.
38One may see here an inherent contradiction. In this model, judges do not convict criminals as judges
take bribes and are subject to politiciansinuence. Therefore, there should be no criminalpoliticians
in the rst place. However, remember that a¢ davits in India disclose not only past convictions; but
also acquittals, discharges, and cases pending. Futhermore, in a totally corrupt world, it is still possible
for a judge to investigate thoroughly, accuse, and acquit in exchange for a higher bribe. Politicians
subject to this procedure would qualify as a criminal politicians in this analysis.
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The criminals reaction function m() is decreasing since g is a concave function.
The judge, when investigating at rate , may extract a bribe b and a private benet
Tm of not being transferred by a criminal politician39. The judges expected prot is
thus:
J(m;) =
1
2
(f + T )m  e() (6)
Since this function is concave, the judge will choose  such that:
e0() =
1
2
(f + T )m (7)
The judges reaction function (m) is increasing since e is a convex function. Con-
sidering that the criminals reaction function m() is decreasing, there always exists a
unique equilibrium that involves both some criminal activity and some investigation.
Comparative statics with respect to the level of criminality of the politician  may
be derived. As visible in (5), an increase in  unambiguously increases crime m since
g is concave. The intuition is that a criminal politician reduces the amount of bribe
to be paid, increasing the incentives for committing crime. However, as visible in (7),
an increase in  also unambiguously increases investigation rate . The intuition is
that a criminal politician increases the incentives for a judge to underreport crime at
^
m and take the bribe, which increases only if the judge gathers evidence of criminal
activity40. The criminal reaction function shifts up, while the judge reaction function
shifts right, providing an increase in the equilibrium level of the investigation rate 
but an ambiguous impact on criminal activity m. This is because a criminal politician
reduce the amount of bribe needed but encourages judges to investigate more to be able
to extract a higher bribe. The overall impact is ambiguous and depends on the functional
forms taken by gain from criminal activity g(m) and cost of investigation e(). Under
39or a loss of Tm imposed by a good politician.
40An alternative way to understand this is to look at the case of good politicians with  < 0: If the
judge chooses to take the bribe as is the case here, he incurs a high cost of transfer. A natural reponse
in this case is to lower the investigation rate  to avoid unearthing criminal activity m.
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reasonable functional forms41, it can be proven that, for a criminal politician ( > 0), :
@m
@
> 0 (8)
It can be further noted in this case that @
C
@
> 0 if  > 0, as C is a combination of
increasing functions of . Criminals benet from criminal politicians exerting a threat of
transfer on judges as this reduces the bribes they have to pay, and more than compensate
for an increased investigation rate to extract bribes (for the functional forms chosen).
Three testable implications may thus be derived from this analysis. First, criminal
politicians reduce the need to pay bribes as the threat of transfer acts as a substitute for
bribes: @b
@
> 0 (as visible in (3)). Second, criminal politicians encourage criminal activity
as less bribes need to be paid: @m
@
> 0 (as visible in (8)) even though judges may be
more inclined to investigate more to extract more bribes. Third, criminals benet from
criminal politicians: @
C
@
> 0. This might explain why, in India, criminals themselves
become politicians: by controlling the enforcement authorities, criminals reduce the
bribes they have to pay to avoid conviction.
The theory only works when the threat of transfer is credible. For example, as ex-
plained above, the Bharatiya Janata Party, a market-oriented centre-right party, is com-
mitted to the independence of the judiciary. If criminal politicians from the Bharatiya
Janata Party restrain themselves from using the threat of transfer to respect their partys
ideology, these predictions should not hold. Furthermore, this mechanism is only true if
the politicians interests converge with the criminals interests: only the criminal activity
of those protected by politicians through the threat of transfer on judges increases; only
the welfare of those protected by politicians through the threat of transfer on judges
increases. This generates three falsication tests: the theory should not work for those
not connected with criminal politicians, for example those bureaucrats not inuences by
41Assume g(m) =
p
m and e() = 2. In this case, (5) becomes 1
2
p
m
= 12(f   T ) and (7) becomes
 = 14 (f + T )m. Solving this system of two equations leads to
@m
@ =
1
3T
2m
5
2 . For a criminal
politician with  > 0, @m@ > 0. For a good politician with  < 0,
@m
@ < 0. This is because, if the ability
of a politician to enforce a transfer decreases, then the threat of a transfer in case of underreporting
is less pregnant. This increases the judges incentives to investigate the criminal activity to increase
the amount of bribe extracted. The natural response of criminals is to reduce criminal activity. The
conclusion is reversed in case of criminal politicians who decrease bribes through a higher threat of
transfer.
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politicians, those committing di¤erent types of crimes as the criminal politicians, or the
poorer sections of society.
India provides an ideal testing ground for this theory. The three testable implications
( @b
@
> 0, @m
@
> 0; @
C
@
> 0) will be tested by measuring the impact of criminal politicians
on the extent of bribes collected by law and order o¢ cials and bureaucrats, reported
criminal activity42 and welfare. A key assumption of this model is the exogeneity of
the level of criminality of the politicians . This is not obvious, but was modelled in
this way as the determinants of the criminality of the politicians is not the point of this
paper. However, to rigorously test the theoretical predictions of the model, one needs
to nd an exogenous source of variation in the level of criminality of the politician in
o¢ ce.
IV Methodology
Criminal politicians may di¤er systematically from non-criminal politicians. For ex-
ample, one could argue that a criminal politician who gets caught is simply less smart
than a criminal politician who does not get caught and is thus classied as a non-criminal.
Comparing economic outcomes in districts with and without criminal politicians in of-
ce would boil down to comparing areas with more or less clever politicians. Another
hypothesis would be that a politician with a criminal record in a corrupt place is an in-
dividual who did not have su¢ cient nancial means to pay a bribe to avoid conviction.
To address these concerns, Table Appendix 1 compares the characteristics of criminal
to non-criminal politicians in a regression framework (the dependent variable is a vari-
able taking the value 1 if the candidate is criminal, 0 otherwise). Column (1) shows
that criminal politicians do not seem to be less educated. This result holds when dis-
aggregating the education variable into seven dummy variables (no schooling, primary,
secondary, intermediary, undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate). Criminal politi-
cians do not come disproportionately from the Bharatiya Janata Party (Column (3)),
42We will use the number of crimes reported and investigated, not the number of cases leading to
conviction. This is because the model predicts no conviction, but a high level of investigation to extract
higher bribes.
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or from a national party43(column (4)). They are not overly represented in state (as-
sembly) elections as opposed to federal (Lok Sabha) elections (column (5)). They seem
to come from lower places and have more liabilities, but not more assets (column (6)).
This result holds when disaggregating assets into its main categories44 (column (7)).
However, pseudo R-squared from the regressions in Table appendix 1 are low, sug-
gesting that criminal politicians di¤er in other unobservable ways from non-criminal
politicians. Comparing districts with or without criminal politicians would not measure
the causal impact of having a criminal politician in o¢ ce. For example, in a totally
corrupt place, it might be that there are no criminal politicians (as they avoid prosecu-
tion by paying the appropriate bribe). Comparing districts with a criminal politician to
districts without, might be equivalent to comparing districts without corruption to dis-
tricts with corruption. In this case, the primary result of the paper (reduced corruption
from law and order, and administrative o¢ cials with a criminal politician) might just
be driven by unobservables.
To address this concern, we use a regression discontinuity design. Regression dis-
continuity designs involve a dichotomous treatment that is a deterministic function of a
single, observed, continuous covariate. Treatment is assigned to those individuals whose
level of the latter covariate crosses a known threshold (Hahn et al, 2001). While applied
in many settings (Angrist and Lavy, 1998; van der Klaauw, 2002), political elections
represent a natural avenue for this method as candidates are elected only if they garner
a 50 percent vote share threshold (Lee, 2008). As we know the criminal record of can-
didates, a regression discontinuity design will then compare districts where a criminal
politician just barely won an election to a non-criminal candidate, and hence barely be-
came elected, to districts where the criminal politician just barely lost the election to a
non-criminal politician. If there exists a random chance element (that has a continuous
density) to the nal vote share, then whether the criminal candidate wins in a closely
contested election with a non-criminal candidate, is determined as if by a ip of a coin.
43Bahujan Samaj Party ("Majoritarian Society Party", BSP), Bharatiya Janata Party ("Indian Peo-
ples Party", BJP), Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)),
Indian National Congress (INC), Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)
44Cash, Deposits in Banks or Non-Banks Institutions, Gold, Ornaments, Bonds, Debentures, Shares
in companies, Value of Motor Vehicles, Value of Agricultural Land, Value of Non-Agricultural Lands,
Value of Residential and Commercial Buildings
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The crucial identication assumption is the continuous density of election scores for
each candidate, at least in the neighborhood of the discontinuity of treatment. This
condition is directly related to candidates incentives and ability to sort around the
threshold (score di¤erence between the two candidates equal to zero). If individuals
have exact control over their own score, the density for each individual is likely to be
discontinuous. When this is the case, the regression discontinuity design is likely to yield
biased impact estimates. Even with complete control, only certain types of fraud would
lead to biased estimates. For example and following Lee (2008), suppose a non-trivial
fraction of criminal candidates (but no non-criminals) had the ability to (1) selectively
invalidate ballots cast for their opponents and (2) perfectly predict what the true vote
share would be without interfering with the vote counting process. In this scenario,
suppose the criminal candidates followed the following rule: (a) if the truevote count
would lead to a non-criminal win, dispute ballots to raise the criminal vote share, but
(b) if the truevote count leads to a criminal win, do nothing. It is easy to see that in
repeated elections, this rule would lead to a discontinuous density in the density of the
scores right at the 1
2
threshold45.
However, the validity of the regression discontinuity design is empirically testable.
First, one may look at the shape of the density function of the score di¤erence between
criminal and non-criminal candidates to see if there is any king of discontinuity at the
threshold. Figure 1 graphs this density function and indicate no such evidence. Sec-
ond, if this form of electoral fraud is empirically important, then all pre-determined
characteristics of districts should be di¤erent between the two sides of the discontinuity
threshold; if it is unimportant, then these characteristics should have the same distribu-
tion on either side of the threshold. We will perform this test by undertaking the same
analysis with pre-determined characteristics.
We therefore perform the following regressions (on a restricted sample of 178 districts
where a criminal candidate faced a non-criminal candidate):
45Note that other rules describing fraudulent behavior would nevertheless lead to a continuous
density in density of the scores. For example, suppose all criminals had the ability to invalidate ballots
during the actual vote counting process. Even if this behavior is rampant, if this ability stops when 90
per cent of the vote is counted, there is still unpredictability in the vote share tally for the remaining
10% of the ballots. It is plausible that the probability density for the vote share in the remaining votes
is continuous.
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yid = 0 + 1score_difd + 2winnerd +X
0
idX +X
0
pdp + s + "id
where yid is the corruption level of individual (law and order, and administrative
o¢ cials46) i living in district d47, score_difd is the score di¤erence between criminal
and non-criminal candidate in district d, winnerd is a variable taking the value 1 if
the criminal candidate was elected (score_difd > 0) and 0 otherwise, Xid is a vector
of individual characteristics, Xpd is a vector of characteristics of politician p elected in
district d, s are state xed e¤ects. 2 is the coe¢ cient of interest, and represent the
discontinuity jump in yid due to a criminal politician being barely elected. Standard
errors clustered at the state level. Following Imbens et al (2008), we also performed
local linear regressions and found the same results.
Critical to this study is the measure of corruption used. The rst measure used
is the value of gifts received. The 61st round of the National sample survey provides
information on the source of the non-durable goods consumed (food, pan, tobacco, in-
toxicants, fuel, and light). These goods may be purchased, home-grown, freely collected,
exchanged for goods and services or received as gifts. Value of gifts of di¤erent products
were added per household to generate a household value of gifts received (see Table 2
for descriptive statistics). While the level of gifts received does not measure only cor-
ruption, our identication strategy is based on the comparison of value of gifts received
for individuals in a district where a criminal politician barely won to a non-criminal
politician; to a district where a criminal politician barely lost. Any systematic di¤erence
in these two districts might indicate a change in in-kind corruption.
The second measure is the consumption-income gap, following Gorodnichenko et al
(2007). This gap may include additional non-reported monetary compensation. We sim-
ply di¤erence the value of expenditures at the household level to an imputed income48.
While the level of the consumption-income gap does not measure only corruption, our
46see Appendix Table 2 for the occupation codes of these individuals.
47Other outcomes will be criminal activity and poverty level measured at the level of district d.
48A problem with the 61st consumption round used in this analysis is that it does not include
information about earnings. We therefore estimate wage using the 55th employment round containing
information on wages. We use a mincer equation regressing the log of wage on occuptaion dummies (at
the 3-digit level), sex, age, education dummies, using multipliers and robust standard errors clustered
at the state level. Using these estimates, we predict wage with the same explanatory variables in the
61st consumption round. See Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
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identication strategy is based on the comparison of the consumption-income gap for
individuals in a district where a criminal politician barely won to a non-criminal politi-
cian; to a district where a criminal politician barely lost. Any systematic di¤erence in
these two districts might indicate a change in bribe-taking.
Criminal data is gathered from the governmental publication Crime In India49.
Poverty levels are measured with district-level headcount ratio using the o¢ cial Planning
commission state poverty lines of the corresponding year50. We now turn to the results.
V Results
A graphical exploration of the results is helpful in order to understand the intuition
of a regression discontinuity design. Figure II shows the level of the consumption-
income gap for law and order, and administrative o¢ cials51. Locally weighted regressions
are presented to smooth the consumption-income gap. One can see a discontinuity at
the threshold of a score di¤erence of zero. The consumption-income gap is lower for
individuals living in a district where a criminal politician barely won than for individuals
living in a district where a criminal politician barely lost. Two falsication exercises
are then presented in gures III and IV. Figure III repeats the same test for clerical
supervisor and cashiers52. These individuals are not under the control of politicians and
the theory presented above is not appropriate anymore. One can see on the graph almost
no discontinuity at the threshold in the consumption-income gap measure. Figure IV
shows the consumption-income gap from the 55th round of the National sample survey
(1999-2000). There is no discontinuity. This represents a test of the identication
assumption: there does not seem a systematic di¤erence in pre-determined levels of
corruption at the threshold.
Table 3 explores the impact of criminal politicians on corruption levels (measured
as value of gifts received) of law and order, and administrative o¢ cials. The sample is
restricted to all occupations falling in these categories. Column (1) indicates that law
49The annual reports Crime In India 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 are from the National Crime
Records Bureau, Ministry of Home A¤airs, Government of India.
50Poverty lines recalculated using new prices are not available for the 61st round (Deaton, 2003).
51see Appendix Table 2 for the occupation codes of these individuals.
52see Appendix Table 2 for the occupation codes of these individuals.
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and order, and administrative o¢ cials experience a 90 percent decline in the value of
gifts received because of the close election of a criminal politician. Column (2) presents
a test of the theory. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a market-oriented centre-right
party, is known to be committed to the independence of the judiciary53. A criminal
politician from the BJP might therefore not be able to misuse punitive transfers to com-
ply with his partys ideology. In column (2), we interact the score di¤erence between
the two candidates and the winner dummy variable (taking the value 1 if the crimi-
nal politician won) with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the criminal politician is from
the Bharatiya Janata Party. Only the coe¢ cient of Winner is signicant, indicating
that the mechanism seems to hold only for politicians capable of inuencing law and
order, and administrative o¢ cials. Columns (3) to (6) present robustness checks in-
cluding control variables. In column (3), individual controls are added (age, household
size, 4 social group dummies (scheduled tribe, scheduled caste, other backward class,
others), a dummy indicating if the household owns land, 3 dummies for the broad oc-
cupation group (law, order, administrative o¢ cials). In column (4), 35 state dummies
are added. In column (5), politicians control variables are included (crime category:
O¤ences against human body, O¤ences against property, Crimes against public order,
Economic crimes, Corruption, Other; Movable Assets (Cash, Deposits in Banks, Finan-
cial Institutions, and Non-Banking nancial companies, NSS, Etc., Gold / Ornaments,
Bonds, Debentures, Shares in companies & Business, Motor Vehicles) and Immovable
Assets (Agricultural Land, Non-Agricultural Lands, Residential and Commercial Build-
ings), Liabilities (total debts at Bank/Financial Institution, Tax Dues and Dues to Govt.
Depts.), party a¢ liation dummies. Results remain remarkably stable and indicate that
criminal politicians reduced corruption of law and order, and administrative o¢ cials.
The insignicance of the e¤ect of BJP politicians indicate that this mechanism works
only when the politician can inuence the bureaucrat. A further test is provided in
column (7) and (8). The same analysis is performed for clerical supervisors and cashier
in column (7) (professors and economists in column (8)). Criminal politicians do not
53Party Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party for the Elections to the 14th Lok Sabha (April-May
2004): The BJP is rmly committed to the independence of the judiciary.
http://www.indian-elections.com/partymanifestoes/bjp.html
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seem to inuence these occupation categories, upon which they have less control than
on judges, policemen, and administrative o¢ cials.
Table 4 performs the same analysis with a di¤erent measure of corruption, the
consumption-income gap, to show that these results are not sensitive to the measure
of corruption used. Column (1) shows that criminal politicians close the consumption-
income gap of law and order, and administrative o¢ cials, by 34 percent. Column (2)
shows that this is not true for criminal politicians who have less control on these agents
(such as BJP politicians). Column (3) and (4) shows that these results hold when using
a 365 days recall period, as opposed to a 30 days recall. Column (5) and (6) show that
this mechanism does not hold for occupations less inuenced by politicians.
The analysis performed in Tables 3 and 4 was conducted at other thresholds of the
score di¤erence to test the robustness of the results. There should be no signicant
results at other levels of score di¤erence, say at a score di¤erence of 10, as criminal
politicians are elected both below and above this threshold. No signicant results have
been found at other thresholds54. An additional concern is the possibility of wrongful
accusations by rival candidates. According to this view, criminal politicians might have
not committed any crimes. To address this concern, we used the information on the
conviction records of politicians. It is found that there are no systematic di¤erences
between the accused and the convicted politicians.
Table 5 presents the test of the identication assumption of the regression disconti-
nuity design: there should be no systematic di¤erence in pre-determined characteristics
between districts where a criminal politician barely won and districts where a criminal
politician barely lost. The dependent variables in rows (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)
are coming from the 55th round (1999-2000) of the National sample survey in India.
The insignicance of the Winner coe¢ cient indicates that there were no di¤erences
in 1999-2000 in value of gifts received, consumption income gap, sex of individual, age
of individual, scheduled caste-scheduled Tribe status, education of individual. Further-
more, rows (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12) show that criminal politicians that barely
won are comparable to criminal politicians that barely lost. Criminal politicians com-
54such as, a score di¤erence of +10 or -10.
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mitted the same amount of murder or corruption o¤ences (rows (7) and (8)), have the
same level of assets or liabilities (rows (9) and (10)), the same education levels (row (11),
and the same a¢ liation to national parties (row (12)). This tends to indicate that there
was no systematic manipulation of the scores at the threshold for certain categories of
politicians.
Table 6 explores the impact of criminal politicians on criminal activity. The theory
predicts that criminal activity should be encouraged only for those connected to politi-
cians, who can then inuence law and order, and administrative o¢ cials to protect them.
Table 1 shows that criminal politicians commit mostly o¤ences against the human body
and against public order. One might expect criminal politicians to protect people com-
mitting similar o¤ences. Rows (1), (2) and (3) show that o¤ences against human body
increase after a criminal politician barely won. For example, row (2) shows that culpable
homicide increase by 26 percent due to criminal politicians. It is important to note that
there were no pre-existing di¤erences in levels of o¤ences against human body in these
districts, as witnessed by the insignicance of the dummy variable Winnerinteracted
with a time dummy equal to 1 before 2004. Rows (7) and (8) show that similar increases
in crimes against public order (riots and arson) occur because of criminal politicians.
No signicant e¤ect is found for o¤ences against property (rows (4), (5), and (6)) and
economic crimes (rows (9), (10), and (11)), accrediting the theory according to which
criminal politicians protect those who commit crime like themselves.
Table 7 explores the impact of criminal politicians on welfare and poverty. As crime
is directly related to economic activity, one may expect welfare to decrease in districts
where a criminal politician is elected. Column (1) shows that mean urban per capita
expenditure decreased by a signicant amount. Column (2) shows that there is no
impact on rural expenditure. This might be because the theory is not applicable if law
and order, and administrative o¢ cials are less inuenced by politicians, which might
be the case in rural areas where the physical distance between politicians often residing
in urban areas might be an obstacle to supervision. The theory generated another
interesting falsication test: welfare of those less connected with criminal politicians, for
example the poorer sections of society, should decrease, but only when politicians might
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have some inuence over law and order, and administrative o¢ cials. Column (3) shows
that urban headcount ratio increases by 7 percentage points or 22 percent because of
criminal politicians, with no e¤ect on rural headcount ration (column (4)). There were
no pre-existing di¤erences in poverty levels at the threshold in 2000 (columns (5) and
(6)).
VI Conclusion
Using a regression discontinuity design, whereby individuals living in districts where
a criminal politicians barely won to districts where a criminal politicians barely lost,
this paper shows that criminal politicians reduce the consumption-income gap of law
and order, and administrative o¢ cials by 34 percent. A potential explanation is that
politicians in India have extensive power over these bureaucrats. Criminal politicians
could then misuse their power to inuence law and order o¢ cials, and prevent the
prosecution of crimes committed by people like themselves. Criminals connected to
criminal politicians would then need to pay less bribes to law and order o¢ cials to
avoid prosecution. This theory is conrmed by two ndings. First, criminal politicians
from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (a party committed to the independence of
the judiciary) are less able to misuse punitive transfers and are not associated with
a reduction in consumption-income gap. Second, other occupations less inuenced by
politicians experience no such decrease.
As less bribes to law and order, and administrative o¢ cials need to be paid, criminal
activity might be encouraged. Crime categories such as o¤ences against human body
and public order, o¤ences similar to those mostly committed by criminal politicians,
experience an approximate 25 percent increase. No signicant e¤ect is found for of-
fences against property and economic crimes accrediting the theory according to which
criminal politicians protect those who commit crime like themselves. This increase in
crime has adverse e¤ects on poverty, in other words those not connected to politicians.
For example, the urban headcount ration increases by 22 percent because of criminal
politicians.
Three policy implications stem from this paper. First, this paper calls attention to
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the problem of the measurement of corruption. If corruption is only measured by bribe-
taking (proxied in this paper by value of gifts received and consumption-income gap),
then corruption is likely to be underestimated as other forms of corruption might exist,
such as, in this case, the threat of punitive transfers exercised by politicians over law and
order, and administrative o¢ cials. Similar to the conclusions of Bardhan et al (2006)
about the impact of decentralization, measures of corruption which focus only on bribes
and exclude such forms of special interest capture provide a misleading impression of the
true welfare e¤ects of criminal politicians. In this case, one cannot interpret the reduction
in bribe-taking as a desirable outcome, since a side consequence is the encouragement
of criminal activity and its adverse impact on the poor.
Second, this paper relates to the literature on decentralization as a way to develop
governance structures that are responsive to the interests of the poor. This literature
emphasizes that, on the one hand, it may enhance the accountability of elected rep-
resentatives and amplify the political voice of poor people while, on the other, it may
enhance the inuence of local elites (Bardhan et al, 2000). This paper provides an ex-
ample of such capture: criminal politicians misusing their inuence over law and order,
and administrative o¢ cials to benet interest groups sharing the same preferences. This
paper thus exemplies the devastating consequences of local governments capture. It
is close in spirit to Besley et al (2004) who looks at the impact of politiciansidentity
(scheduled caste or tribe) on local public good provision.
Third, considering these devastating consequences, the next step is to nd ways
to reduce the prevalence of criminal politicians in o¢ ce. The reform mandating the
publicization of criminal records of politicians (used in this paper) was exactly aimed
at this, by increasing the level of political awareness. A promising avenue of research
is therefore the evaluation of the impact of the reform on the probability of election of
criminal politicians.
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Appendix table 1: correlates of criminality of politicians
Dependent variable: Politician is a criminal (1 or 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
of politician (0.39) (0.54) (0.39) (0.31) (0.60) (0.76)
Primary -0.03
(0.23)
Secondary 0.14
(1.18)
Intermediary 0.08
(0.61)
Undergraduate 0.07
(0.73)
Postgraduate 0.11
(1.03)
Bharatiya Janata Party 0.06
candidate (1.29)
National party (BSP, BJP, -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
CPI, CPM, INC, NCP) (0.18) (0.94) (1.01)
local elections -0.00
(not federal elections) (0.01)
Number of voters -0.03 -0.03
by district (in millions) (2.74)*** (2.85)***
Liabilities 0.01 0.01
(2.13)** (1.99)**
Assets -0.00
(1.58)
Cash -0.09
(1.50)
Deposits in Banks 0.01
or Non-Banks Institutions (1.39)
Gold, Ornaments -0.01
(0.26)
Bonds, Debentures, -0.00
Shares in companies (1.54)
Value of Motor Vehicles 0.00
(0.13)
Value of Agricultural Land -0.00
(0.13)
Value of Non-Agri. Lands 0.00
(2.42)**
Value of Residential -0.00
and Commercial Buildings (1.51)
Observations 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0002 0.0058 0.003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0371 0.0438
Probit regressions. Marginal e¤ects are shown at the mean. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Appendix Table 2: Occupations considered in the 55th and 61st Rounds of the Indian National Sample Survey
Broad category National occupations code (1968) / National industry code (1998) Number of observations
NSS55 NSS61
Legal o¢ cials 140 lawyers 1155 190
141 judges 22 12
142 legal assistant 36 16
149 Jurists* 151 25
Total 1364 243
Order o¢ cials 75231 Public order and safety activities of the Union government 510 108
75232 Public order and safety activities of the State governments 2572 879
571 Policemen and Detectives (Inspector; Sub-Insp.; Constable; Detective) 3480 913
572 Customs Examiners, Patrollers and Related Workers** 106 23
573 Protection Force, Home Guard and Security Workers 998 286
574 Watchmen, Chowkidars and Gate Keepers (Watchman; Gateman) 2876 811
579 Protective Service Workers 153 67
Total 10695 3087
Administrative 200 Elected O¢ cials, Union Government 6 4
o¢ cials 201 Elected O¢ cials, State Government 64 11
202 Elected O¢ cials, Local Bodies 40 35
209 Elected O¢ cials, n.e.c. 10 3
210 Administrative and Executive O¢ cials, Union Govt 468 69
211 Administrative and Executive O¢ cials, State Government 1111 201
212 Administrative and Executive O¢ cials, Quasi Government 142 19
213 Administrative and Executive O¢ cials, Local Bodies 139 21
219 Administrative and Executive O¢ cials, Govt and Local Bodies, n.e.c 107 186
310 village o¢ cials 819 309
Total 2906 858
Clerical supervisor 300 Clerical Supervisors, O¢ ce Superintendents, Head Clerks, Section Heads 2090 367
and cashiers 301 Other Supervisors, Inspectors, etc. 1309 240
302 Ministerial and O¢ ce Assistants 1860 317
309 Clerical and Other Supervisors, Other 1294 185
330 Book Keepers and Accounts Clerks 1653 326
331 Cashiers 869 158
339 Bookkeepers, Cashiers and Related Workers, n.e.c. 164 31
Total 9239 1624
professor, 150 University and Colleges Teachers 1159 265
economists 110 Economists 0 1
111 Economic Investigators and Related Workers 25 10
119 Economists and Related Workers, n.e.c 25 1
101 Statisticians 34 4
104 Statistical Investigators and Related Workers 188 23
109 Mathematicians, Statisticians and Related Workers ,n.e.c 29 2
Total 1460 306
* including Prothonotary and Senior Master; Registrar (Appellate Side, High Court); Registrar; Master O¢ cial Referee and Registrar in
Equity etc; Taxing Master; Insolvency Registrar; O¢ cial Assignee (High Court ); Court Receiver and Liquidator; Sheri¤; Shirestedar; Petition
Writer
**Inspector, Customs; Inspector, Excise; Supervisor, Customs; Appraiser, Customs; Searcher, Customs; Sepoy, Customs; Constable, Excise
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Figure I: density function of the score di¤erence between criminal and non-criminal
candidates.
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Figure II: locally weighted regression (lowess) of the consumption-income gap for law and
order, and administrative o¢ cials in 2004-2005 (61st round of the NSS)
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Figure III: locally weighted regression (lowess) of the consumption-income gap for clerical
supervisor and cashiers in 2004-2005 (61st round of the NSS).
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Figure IV: locally weighted regression (lowess) of the consumption-income gap for law and
order, and administrative o¢ cials in 1999-2000 (55th round of the NSS)
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